Intent/Mental State
In general
• The mens rea element for a criminal offense is almost inevitably, absent a defendant's confession or admission, a matter of circumstantial proof.
Bowser v. State, 984 N.E.2d 236, 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)(citing Hampton v. State, 961 N.E.2d 480, 487 (Ind. 2012))
Klinker v. First Merchs. Bank, N.A., 964 N.E.2d 190, 195 (Ind. 2012)(quoting Hampton v. State, 961 N.E.2d 480, 487 (Ind. 2012))(“As we recently explained, ‘the mens rea element for a criminal offense is almost inevitably, absent a defendant's confession or admission, a matter of circumstantial proof.’”)
See Hightower v. State, 866 N.E.2d 356, 368 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied(“Intent is a mental function; hence, absent a confession, it often must be proven by circumstantial evidence.”)
Proving mens rea
• Mens rea can be established by circumstantial evidence . . . .
Boling v. State, 982 N.E.2d 1055, 1057 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013)(citing C.L.Y. v. State, 816 N.E.2d 894, 905 (Ind. 2000), trans. denied)
Cf. Baxter v. State, 891 N.E.2d 110, 121 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)(citing Lykins v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1265, 1271 (Ind. Ct. App. 2000))(“The State is not required to prove mens rea by direct and positive evidence.”)
• Intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
Lee v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied(citing E.H. v. State, 764 N.E.2d 681, 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), reh’g denied, trans. denied)
Mason v. State, 944 N.E.2d 68, 73 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied(citing Hayworth v. State, 798 N.E.2d 503, 508 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003))
McCaskill v. State, 3 N.E.3d 1047, 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)(citing Lee v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied)
• Because knowledge is a mental state of the actor, it may be proved by circumstantial evidence . . . .
Smith v. State, 963 N.E.2d 1110, 1113 (Ind. 2012)
Wilson v. State, 835 N.E.2d 1044, 1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied
Taylor v. State, 975 N.E.2d 392, 394 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied(quoting Wilson v. State, 835 N.E.2d 1044, 1049 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied)
Inferring mens rea
• Knowledge or intent may be inferred from the facts and circumstances of a case and it is within the province of the jury to draw an inference of knowledge or intent from the facts presented.
Gibson v. State, 515 N.E.2d 492, 496 (Ind. 1987)(citing Burkhalter v. State, 397 N.E.2d 596, 599 (Ind. 1987))
See Capps v. State, 282 N.E.2d 833, 834 (Ind. 1972)(“It is well established law that knowledge or intent may be inferred from the facts and circumstances presented in each case.”)
See also Lee v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied(citing E.H. v. State, 764 N.E.2d 681, 683 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002) , reh’g denied, trans. denied)(“The fact finder is entitled to infer intent from the surrounding circumstances.”)
• Knowledge and intent are both mental states and, absent an admission by the defendant, the trier of fact must resort to the reasonable inferences from both the direct and circumstantial evidence to determine whether the defendant has the requisite knowledge or intent to commit the offense in question.
Stokes v. State, 922 N.E.2d 758, 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied(citing Johnson v. State, 837 N.E.2d 209, 214 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied)
• Intent is a mental function. Absent an admission by the defendant, it must be determined from consideration of the defendant’s conduct and the natural and usual consequences thereof. The trier of fact must resort to reasonable inferences based on an examination of the surrounding circumstances to determine whether, from the person’s conduct and the natural consequences of what might be expected from that conduct, there is a showing or inference of the intent to commit that conduct.
Gaerte v. State, 808 N.E.2d 164, 166 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied(citing Lush v. State, 783 N.E.2d 1191, 1196 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003))
See Diallo v. State, 928 N.E.2d 250, 253 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010)(quoting M.Q.M. v. State, 840 N.E.2d 441, 446 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006))(“Because intent is a mental state, the fact-finder often must ‘resort to the reasonable inferences based upon an examination of the surrounding circumstances to determine’ whether—from the person's conduct and the natural consequences therefrom—there is a showing or inference of the requisite criminal intent.”)
See also McCaskill v. State, 3. N.E.3d 1047, 1050 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)(citing Lee v. State, 973 N.E.2d 1207, 1210 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied)(“Intent can be inferred from a defendant’s conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct logically and reasonably points.”)
See also Mitchell v. State, 557 N.E.2d 660, 664 (Ind. 1990)(citing Stanley v. State, 531 N.E.2d 484, 485 (Ind. 1988))(“Intent is a mental state of the actor, and as such, the trier of fact must resort to reasonable inferences based upon examination of the surrounding circumstances to determine intent.”)
• It is generally presumed that a person intends the natural, necessary, and probable consequences of his or her acts.
Book v. State, 880 N.E.2d 1240, 1252 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008), trans. denied(citing Johnson v. State, 455 N.E.2d 932, 937 (Ind. 1983), reh’g denied)
See Heavrin v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1075, 1079 (Ind. 1996), reh’g denied(citing Johansen v. State, 499 N.E.2d 1128, 1132 (Ind. 1986))(“[O]ne is presumed to have intended the reasonable results of his or her own acts.”)