Relevancy
• [T]he admission of evidence “is first and foremost a question of relevancy.”
Smith v. Johnston, 854 N.E.2d 388, 390 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)(quoting Chemco Transport, Inc. v. Conn, 506 N.E.2d 1111, 1115 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), reh’g denied, vacated in part on other grounds, 527 N.E.2d 179 (Ind. 1988))
Test for relevancy
• Evidence is relevant if:
(a) it has any tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.
Interpretations of the test for relevancy
• Evidence is relevant if it has a logical tendency to prove a material fact.
Booker, Inc. v. Morrill, 639 N.E.2d 358, 363 (Ind. 1994)(citing Valinet v. Eskew, 574 N.E.2d 283, 286 (Ind. 1991))
• In order to be admissible, the evidence need only have some tendency, however slight, to make the existence of the fact more or less probable, or tend to shed any light upon the guilt or innocence of the accused.
Lycan v. State, 671 N.E.2d 447, 453 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996)(citing Tynes v. State, 650 N.E.2d 685, 687 (Ind. 1995))(emphasis added)
• [Relevant evidence] often includes facts that merely fill in helpful background information for the jury, even though they may only be tangentially related to the issues presented.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Earl, 33 N.E.3d 337, 341 (Ind. 2015)(citing McFarland v. State, 390 N.E.2d 989, 993 (Ind. 1979))
• Relevant evidence should be admitted regardless of its weight.
Smith v. Johnston, 854 N.E.2d 388, 390 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)(quoting Chemco Transport, Inc. v. Conn, 506 N.E.2d 1111, 1115 (Ind. Ct. App. 1987), reh’g denied, vacated in part on other grounds, 527 N.E.2d 179 (Ind. 1988))
Not all relevant evidence is admissible
• “Although evidence must be relevant to be admissible, not all relevant evidence is admissible.”
Davidson v. Bailey, 826 N.E.2d 80, 85 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005)(quoting Wohlwend v. Edwards, 796 N.E.2d 781, 785 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003))(internal citation omitted)
• Relevant evidence is admissible unless any of the following provides otherwise:
(a) the United States Constitution;
(b) the Indiana constitution;
(c) a statute not in conflict with these rules;
(d) these rules; or
(e) other rules applicable in the courts of this state.
Irrelevant evidence is not admissible.
Excluding relevant evidence for prejudice, confusion, or other reasons: In general
• The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.
Excluding relevant evidence for prejudice, confusion, or other reasons: As applied to criminal prosecutions
• All evidence that is relevant to a criminal prosecution is inherently prejudicial, and thus the Evidence Rule 403 inquiry boils down to a balance of the probative value of the proffered evidence against the likely unfair prejudicial impact of that evidence.
Duvall v. State, 978 N.E.2d 417, 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied(citing Carter v. State, 766 N.E.2d 377, 382 (Ind. 2002), reh’g denied)
See Rasnick v. State, 2 N.E.3d 17, 26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied(quoting Duvall v. State, 978 N.E.2d 417, 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied)(“However, all evidence is ‘inherently prejudicial’ and, therefore, the Rule 403 analysis ‘boils down to a balance of the probative value of the proffered evidence against the likely unfair prejudicial impact of that evidence.’”)
See also Beasley v. State, 29 N.E.3d 802, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)(“All relevant evidence necessarily is ‘prejudicial’ in a criminal prosecution . . . .”)
Excluding relevant evidence for prejudice, confusion, or other reasons: Interpretations of “unfair prejudice”
• Relevant evidence is not inadmissible merely because it is prejudicial.
Sevits v. State, 651 N.E.2d 278, 280 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995), trans. denied(citing Kremer v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1068, 1073 (Ind. 1987), reh’g denied)
Link v. State, 648 N.E.2d 709, 712 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)(citing Kremer v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1068, 1073 (Ind. 1987), reh’g denied)
• Rule 403 only allows trial courts to exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, not simply prejudice to a party's theory of the case.
Walker v. Cuppett, 808 N.E.2d 85, 101 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)
See Beasley v. State, 29 N.E.2d 802, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)(citing Baer v. State, 866 N.E.2d 752, 763 (Ind. 2007), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1313 (2008)(quoting Steward v. State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 499 (Ind.1995), reh'g denied))(“The Indiana Supreme Court has ‘emphasized that the relevant inquiry is not merely whether the matter is prejudicial to the defendant's interests, but whether ‘it is unfairly prejudicial.’’”)
• “Unfair prejudice addresses the way in which the jury is expected to respond to the evidence; it looks to the capacity of the evidence to persuade by illegitimate means, or the tendency of the evidence to suggest decision on an improper basis . . . .”
Myers v. State, 33 N.E.3d 1077, 1110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), reh’g denied, trans. denied(quoting Ingram v. State, 715 N.E.2d 405, 407 (Ind. 1999))(alteration in the original)footnote omitted)
• “When determining the likely unfair prejudicial impact, courts will look for the dangers that the jury will (1) substantially overestimate the value of the evidence or (2) that the evidence will arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury.”
Duvall v. State, 978 N.E.2d 417, 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied(quoting Carter v. State, 766 N.E.2d 377, 382 (Ind. 2002), reh’g denied)
See Bell v. State, 29 N.E.3d 137, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied(citing Duvall v. State, 978 N.E.2d 417, 428 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied)(“When determining any unfair prejudicial impact, courts should look for the dangers that the jury will substantially overestimate the value of the evidence or that the evidence will arouse or inflame the passions or sympathies of the jury.”)
Discretion of the trial court
• A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admission or exclusion of evidence.
Caesar v. State, 964 N.E.2d 911, 915 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied(citing Kimbrough v. State, 911 N.E.2d 621, 631 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009))
See Ford Motor Co. v. Ammerman, 705 N.E.2d 539, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh’g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1021 (2000)(citing Ind. Ins. v. Plummer Power Mower, 590 N.E.2d 1085, 1088 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992))(“[A] a trial court is afforded considerable latitude in the admission or exclusion of evidence.”)
See also Harrison v. State, 32 N.E.3d 240, 250 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied(citing Fuqua v. State, 984 N.E.2d 709, 713-14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied)(“Questions regarding the admission of evidence are entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court.”)
• The question of relevance is for the discretion of the trial judge.
Ford Motor Co. v. Ammerman, 705 N.E.2d 539, 555 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), reh’g denied, trans. denied, cert. denied, 529 U.S. 1021 (2000)(citing Booker, Inc. v. Morrill, 639 N.E.2d 358, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994))
See Sanders v. State, 704 N.E.2d 119, 124 (Ind. 1999)(citing Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 220 (Ind. 1997))(“Relevance is broadly defined as probative value, and the trial court has wide discretion in ruling on the relevance of proffered evidence.”)
• A trial court does not abuse its discretion by excluding irrelevant evidence.
Akiwumi v. Akiwumi, 23 N.E.3d 734, 739 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014)
• Evaluation of whether the probative value of an evidentiary matter is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice is a discretionary task best performed by the trial court.
Bell v. State, 29 N.E.3d 137, 142 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015), trans. denied(citing Bryant v. State, 984 N.E.2d 240, 249 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied)
See Beasley v. State, 29 N.E.3d 802, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)(citing Willingham v. State, 794 N.E.2d 1110, 1116 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003))(“In applying the balancing test of Evidence Rule 403, the trial court has ‘wide latitude,’ . . . .”)
See also Rasnick v. State, 2 N.E.3d 17, 26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied(quoting Bostick v. State, 773 N.E.2d 266, 271 (Ind. 2002), reh’g denied)(“This balancing is ‘a discretionary task best performed by the trial court.’”)