Miranda Warnings

Holding in Miranda v. Arizona

• To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed to protect the privilege and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478-79 (1966), reh’g denied(emphasis added)

Interpretations of the holding in Miranda v. Arizona

• Miranda requires a “warn-first practice.”

Kelly v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1045, 1055 (Ind. 2013)(quoting Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 615 (2004))

• The person must be warned prior to any questioning that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires.

State v. Banks, 2 N.E.3d 71, 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied(citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966), reh’g denied)(emphasis added)

See Smith v. State, 497 N.E.2d 601, 605-06 (Ind. Ct. App.1986)(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966), reh’g denied)(alteration in the original)(“Under Miranda v. Arizona the arresting officers are required, prior to the initiation of questioning, to fully apprise the suspect of the state's intention to use his statements to secure a conviction, and must inform the suspect of his rights to remain silent as well as his right to ‘have counsel present . . . if [he] so desires.’”)

See also Bryant v. State, 959 N.E.2d 315, 321 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)(citing Wright v.State, 766 N.E.2d 1223, 1229 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002))(“When a subject is in custody, Miranda requires that he be informed of the right to the presence and advice of counsel during custodial interrogation by the police, of the right to remain silent, and that any statement he makes may be used as evidence against him.”)

Purpose

• The purpose of Miranda and the warnings it prescribes are to protect a suspect's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination “‘by placing reasonable limitations on police interrogations.’”

Bean v. State, 973 N.E.2d 35, 40 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied(quoting Hendricks v. State, 897 N.E.2d 1208,1214 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)(quoting Sauerheberv. State, 698 N.E.2d 796, 801 (Ind. 1998)))

See Gibson v. State, 733 N.E.2d 945, 952 (Ind. Ct. App.2000)(citing Curry v. State, 643N.E.2d 963, 976 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994), reh’g denied, trans. denied)(“Miranda warnings are based upon the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause, and were designed to protect an individual from being compelled to testify against himself.”)

See also State v. Ashley, 661 N.E.2d 1208, 1211 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995)(citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966), reh’g denied)(“The Miranda warning is meant to protect a suspect during an interrogation “in a police dominated atmosphere.”)

See also Smith v. State, 983 N.E.2d 226, 231 (Ind. Ct. App.2013), trans. denied(citing Kelley v. State, 825 N.E.2d 420, 427 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005))(“Miranda warnings are used to secure a criminal defendant's right against self-incrimination.”)

• The purpose of Miranda is to dispel the inherently coercive effect of police custody and interrogation.

S.G. v. State, 956 N.E.2d 668, 675 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011), trans. denied(citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966), reh’g denied)

• The prophylactic Miranda warnings therefore are “not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but [are] instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination [is] protected.”

New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984)(quoting Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974))(alterations in the original)

Gavin v. State, 41 N.E.3d 1038, 1042 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015)(quoting New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984))(alterations in the original)

Form and content of Miranda warnings: In general

• The information which must be given to a suspect prior to custodial interrogation is expressly set out in the Miranda opinion:

“At the outset, if a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent.

“The warning of the right to remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of foregoing it.

“[W]e hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation . . . .

“[I]t is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him.

“The warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant.”

Edwards v. State, 412 N.E.2d 223, 225 (Ind. 1980)(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467-68,469, 471, 473, 476 (1966), reh’g denied)

See McClure v. State, 803 N.E.2d 210, 213 (Ind. Ct. App.2004), trans. denied(citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966), reh’g denied)(“These procedural safeguards include an advisement to the accused the he/she has the right to remain silent, that anything said can be used against him or her, that he or she has the right to an attorney, and that one will be appointed if he or she cannot afford one.”)

Form and content of Miranda warnings: Whether the precise language from Miranda needs to be used

• As Miranda itself made clear, the specific warnings given to a suspect need not use the precise language of the decision.

Sauerheber v. State, 698 N.E.2d 796, 803 (Ind.1998)(citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966), reh’g denied)

See California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355, 359-60 (1981)(quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966), reh’g denied)(alteration in the original)(“Miranda itself indicated that no talismanic incantation was required to satisfy its strictures. The Court in that case stated that “[t]he warnings required and the waiver necessary in accordance with our opinion today are, in the absence of a fully effective equivalent, prerequisites to the admissibility of any statement made by a defendant.”)

See also Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 202 (1989)(“We have never insisted that Miranda warnings be given in the exact form described in that decision.”)

• Miranda, followed by Edwards, indicated the proper advice to give to one about to be interrogated is that that person has a right to remain silent and that anything said “can and will be used against you in court.” In the advisements given by police to [the defendant] here, the word “will” was left out and the advice given was “anything you say can be used against you in court.” In all other respects the advisements given complied with Miranda and Edwards. [The defendant] acknowledged she understood them and was willing to waive them. She then gave her statements. Under the facts and circumstances here we do not see the omission of the word “will” to be such a fatal variance as to require suppression of the statements.

Myers v. State, 510 N.E.2d 1360, 1365 (Ind. 1987)

See Santana v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1355, 1358 (Ind. Ct. App.1997)(citations omitted)(Miranda, which was followed in Indiana by Edwards, indicated that the proper advice to give one about to be interrogated is that the person has the right to remain silent and that anything said can and will be used against him in court. Here, the advisements simply said that anything can be used in court. Our supreme court reviewed this identical issue in Myers, and held that the omission of the word will was not a fatal variance so as to require suppression of the statements. Particularly, in Myers, the court relied upon the fact that the advisements were in all other respects in conformance with Miranda, and the [defendant] understood the rights and was willing to waive them. Similarly, in the case before us, the advisements were otherwise accurate and [the defendant] acknowledged that he understood those rights and still wished to speak with police. Under the facts and circumstances, the trial court did not err in denying [the defendant’s] renewed motion to suppress.”)

• The Supreme Court has previously held that the advisement “[a lawyer] will be appointed for you . . . if and when you go to court” satisfies Miranda, as it simply anticipates a suspect's question regarding when counsel will be appointed.

Sauerheber v. State, 698 N.E.2d 796, 803 (Ind.1998)(quoting Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 198 (1989))

• A police officer's pre-interrogation advisement to murder suspect that attorney would be appointed for him “probably after you're arrested” satisfied the requirements of Miranda.

See Sauerheber v. State, 698 N.E.2d 796, 803 (Ind.1998)

Form and content of Miranda warnings: Determining the sufficiency of Miranda warnings

• [T]he inquiry is simply whether the warnings reasonably convey to a suspect his rights as required by Miranda.

State v. Banks, 2 N.E.3d 71, 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied(citing Florida v. Powell, 559 U.S. 50, 60 (2010))

• “There is no formal requirement for how the State must meet its burden of advising an individual consistent with Miranda, so this court examines the issue in light of the totality of the circumstances.”

State v. Banks, 2 N.E.3d 71, 78 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied(quoting State v. Keller, 845 N.E.2d 154, 161 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006))

• In determining whether a defendant has received a clear, understandable warning of his rights, we must examine the words in the context used, considering the age, background, and intelligence of the individual being interrogated.

Malloch v. State, 980 N.E.2d 887, 899 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied(citing Sotelo v. State, 342 N.E.2d 844, 847 (Ind.1976))

See Bauer v. State, 300 N.E.2d 364, 367 (Ind. Ct. App.1973)(quoting Coyote v. United States,380 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 992 (1967))(“The crucial test of the Miranda warning was set forth in Coyote v. United States: ‘ . . . What Miranda does require is meaningful advice to the unlettered and unlearned in language which he can comprehend and on which he can knowingly act. We will not indulge semantical debates between counsel over the particular words used to inform an individual of his rights. The crucial test is whether the words in the context used, considering the age, background and intelligence of the individual being interrogated, impart a clear, understandable warning of all of his rights.’”)

Form and content of Miranda warnings: Examples of advisements not mandated by Miranda

• [The defendant] contends his Miranda warnings were improper because he was not advised during one of his advisements that he could stop the questioning at any time. This is not one of the advisements required under Miranda.

Tiller v. State, 541 N.E.2d 885, 893 (Ind. 1989)

See Smith v. State, 602 N.E.2d 1043, 1044 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992)(quoting Tiller v. State, 541 N.E.2d 885, 893 (Ind. 1989))(“[The defendant] complains that he was not advised that he had the right to stop the questioning at any time and to invoke his Fifth Amendment right to silence. . . . The opportunity to stop questioning ‘is not one of the advisements required under Miranda.’”)

• [The defendant] also maintains that if he had known the death penalty was possible he would not have confessed. [The defendant] suggests that we adopt a new rule which requires a suspect to be informed, prior to a custodial interrogation, that the death penalty is possible. We decline to adopt such a rule.

Burgans v. State, 500 N.E.2d 183, 185 (Ind. 1986)

• Miranda does not require that an accused be specifically informed by the interrogator of the precise nature of the potential charges for which the accused is being questioned.

Armour v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1294, 1298 (Ind. 1985)

Burgans v. State, 500 N.E.2d 183, 185 (Ind. 1986)(citing Armour v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1294, 1298 (Ind. 1985))

See Douglas v. State, 481 N.E.2d 107, 112 (Ind.1985)(citing Armour v. State, 479 N.E.2d 1294, 1298 (Ind. 1985))(“Miranda does not require an accused be informed of the penal consequences or the specificity of charges.”)

Example of Miranda warnings used in Indiana

• Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights. You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the right to talk to a lawyer for advice before we ask you any questions and to have him with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before any questioning if you wish. If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer present, you will still have the right to stop answering at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you talk to a lawyer. Do you understand these rights?

Indiana Law Enforcement Academy "Miranda Card"

Repetition: In general

• Police are not required to rewarn suspects from time to time.

Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370, 386 (2010), reh’g denied

• While it is the better practice to advise an accused at the beginning of each interview, Miranda warnings do not necessarily need to be repeated on each separate occasion.

Grey v. State, 404 N.E.2d 1348, 1352 (Ind. 1980)(citing United States v. Springer, 460 F.2d 1344, 1353 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 873 (1972))

See Grimes v. State, 454 N.E.2d 388, 391 (Ind.1983)(citing Grey v. State, 404 N.E.2d 1348, 1352 (Ind. 1980))(“While the better practice is to advise an accused of his constitutional rights at the beginning of each interview, the warnings do not necessarily have to be repeated on each occasion of questioning.”)

See also Harkins v. State, 415 N.E.2d 139, 141 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)(citing Grey v. State, 404 N.E.2d 1348, 1352 (Ind. 1980))(“Our Supreme Court has held that while it is the better practice to advise an accused of his ‘Miranda Rights’ at the beginning of each interview, it is not an absolute prerequisite.”)

• For more information about the resumption of interrogation, please review Resumption of Interrogation.

• An advisement in accordance with Miranda guidelines need not be repeated so long as the circumstances attending an interruption or adjournment in the process are such that the suspect has not been deprived of the opportunity to make an informed and intelligent assessment of interests involved in the interrogation, including the right to cut off questioning.

Hendricks v. State, 554 N.E.2d 1140, 1145 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990), aff’d in relevant part, 562 N.E.2d 725 (Ind. 1990)(citing Partlow v. State, 453 N.E.2d 259, 269 (Ind. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1072 (1984))

See Moredock v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1247, 1249 (Ind.1987)(citing Partlow v. State, 453 N.E.2d 259, 268, 269 (Ind. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1072 (1984))(“If at the commencement of a custodial interrogation the suspect has been given an advisement and waived his rights in accordance with Miranda guidelines, that advisement need not be repeated so long as circumstances attending any interruption or adjournment of process are such that the suspect has not been deprived of the opportunity to make an informed and intelligent assessment of his interests involved in the interrogation, including the right to cut off questioning.”)

See also Shane v. State, 615 N.E.2d 425, 427 (Ind.1993)(citing Moredock v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1247, 1249 (Ind.1987))(“We have held that after a Miranda advisement has been made the advisement need not be repeated if the circumstances surrounding the interruption or adjournment of the process have not deprived the suspect of the opportunity to make an informed and intelligent assessment of his interests involved in the interrogation.”)

See also Ogle v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind.1998)(citing Heavrin v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1075, 1081-82 (Ind. 1996), reh’g denied)(“Although it might be the better practice to reiterate such warnings after an interruption of questioning, a readvisement is only necessary when the interruption deprived the suspect of an opportunity to make an informed and intelligent assessment of his interests.”)

• The rationale is that if the interruption is part of a continual effort by the police to gather information from the suspect, there can be little doubt as to the suspect's interests in the matter.

Shane v. State, 615 N.E.2d 425, 427 (Ind. 1993)(citing Moredock v. State, 514 N.E.2d 1247, 1249 (Ind.1987))

See Ogle v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1146, 1149 (Ind.1998)(citing Shane v. State, 615 N.E.2d 425, 427 (Ind. 1993))(“If the interruption is part of a continual effort to investigate the suspect, then the suspect's interests remain fairly clear.”)

Repetition: Interpretations of “part of a continual effort by the police to gather information”

• Where the defendant had been advised of his Miranda rights at a police station before being transported to the hospital for the taking of blood and hair samples, a new Miranda warning was not required upon the defendant's return to the police station.

See Shane v. State, 615 N.E.2d 425, 428 (Ind. 1993)(“Examination of the totality of the circumstances leads us to the conclusion that [the defendant] voluntarily appeared at the police station, received the Miranda advisement, executed a waiver of those rights without the force of threats, promises, or coercion, consented to providing officials with physical samples, and answered questions upon his return to the police station. The trial court did not err by denying [the defendant’s] motion to suppress statements made by him to police officers.”)

• As in Shane, the interruption here was “part of a continual effort by the police to gather information.” The interruption was simply to get defendant to a place where his statement could be recorded. It was not a situation where defendant left the station and went somewhere on his own not related to the interrogation and then came back for further questioning.

Heavrin v. State, 675 N.E.2d 1075, 1082 (Ind. 1996), reh’g denied(quoting Shane v. State, 615 N.E.2d 425, 427 (Ind. 1993))

• The defendant was brought into the police station for questioning. He was advised, and signed a waiver, of his Miranda rights at the time the police started questioning. After some questioning, the police stopped the interrogation to investigate part of the defendant's story. When the questioning resumed less than an hour later, the police did not advise the defendant a second time of his Miranda rights. . . . The undisputed evidence shows that the interruption in the interrogation was “part of a continual effort by the police to gather information,” and, thus, the trial court properly denied the defendant's motion to suppress his statements made during the second interview.

Ogle v. State, 698 N.E.2d 1146, 1148-49 (Ind.1998)(quoting Shane v. State, 615 N.E.2d 425, 427 (Ind. 1993))

• [The defendant] argues that statements made in the course of his [second] interview are inadmissible because the interview was not preceded by a Miranda warning. The [second] interview began at 2:35 A.M., less than four hours after the [first] interview ended. . . . Although the break in Ogle was shorter than the break here, the interruption in [the defendant’s] interrogation was part of a continuing investigation, and [the defendant’s] interests remained clear. The trial court therefore did not err in admitting the [second] interview at trial.

Wilkes v. State, 917 N.E.2d 675, 683 (Ind. 2009), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 562 U.S. 981 (2010)

Effect of a violation of Miranda

• Statements elicited in violation of Miranda are generally inadmissible in a criminal trial and subject to a motion to suppress.

Gauvin v. State, 878 N.E.2d 515, 520 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied(citing Brabandt v. State, 797 N.E.2d 855, 861 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003))

See State v. Hicks, 882 N.E.2d 238, 241 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008))(citing Morris v. State, 871 N.E.2d 1011, 1016 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied)(“Statements given in violation of Miranda are normally inadmissible in a criminal trial.”)

See also Cox v. State, 854 N.E.2d 1187, 1193 (Ind. Ct. App.2006)(citing King v. State, 844 N.E.2d 92, 96 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005))(“Statements elicited in violation of this rule of law are generally inadmissible in the defendant's criminal trial.”)