Duress
• Coercion or duress is a defense to prosecution for a criminal act.
Hood v. State, 313 N.E.2d 546, 547 (Ind. Ct. App. 1974)
• Duress is a defense provided by statute.
Murrell v. State, 960 N.E.2d 854, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)
• It is a defense that the person who engaged in the prohibited conduct was compelled to do so by threat of imminent serious bodily injury to himself or another person. With respect to offenses other than felonies, it is a defense that the person who engaged in the prohibited conduct was compelled to do so by force or threat of force.
• Compulsion to commit a crime by threats of violence sufficient to induce a well-grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm in case of refusal will excuse the defendant.
Love v. State, 393 N.E.2d 178, 179 (Ind. 1979)(citing Simpson v. State, 381 N.E.2d 1229, 1234 (Ind. 1978))
Definition and interpretations of “compelled”
•Compulsion under this section exists only if the force, threat, or circumstances are such as would render a person of reasonable firmness incapable of resisting the pressure.
• The compulsion that will excuse a criminal act must be clear and conclusive.
Murrell v. State, 960 N.E.2d 854, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)(citing Love v. State, 393 N.E.2d 178, 179 (Ind. 1979))
• Such compulsion must arise without the negligence or fault of the defendant who claims this defense.
Murrell v. State, 960 N.E.2d 854, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)(citing Love v. State, 393 N.E.2d 178, 179 (Ind. 1979))
• [The defendant] was threatened, but she was also promised that she would receive money for medicine in exchange for delivering the contraband. Given this evidence of a potential reward to [the defendant], we cannot say that the compulsion she faced was clear and conclusive.
Murrell v. State, 960 N.E.2d 854, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)
Interpretations of “imminent serious bodily injury”
• [T]he alternative with which the defendant is faced must be instant and imminent.
Murrell v. State, 960 N.E.2d 854, 857 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012)(citing Love v. State, 393 N.E.2d 178, 179 (Ind. 1979))
See Hensley v. State, 583 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)(citing Love v. State, 393 N.E.2d 178, 179 (Ind. 1979))(“ [T]o constitute duress, the compulsion must be such that the alternative with which the defendant is faced be instant and imminent . . . .”)
• Even if duress were a valid defense to a charge of homicide, the defendant who fatally stabbed the victim was not facing an “imminent” threat, where the victim was shackled and the defendant was not.
See McCune v. State, 491 N.E.2d 993, 995 (Ind. 1986)(citing IC 35-41-3-8)(“Even if duress were a valid defense, McCune was clearly not facing an ‘imminent’ threat.”)
• [T]he duress defense is not intended to be given a broad reading. The defense is only allowed where the prohibited conduct is compelled by threat of imminent serious bodily injury. [The defendant’s] testimony alleges only that his accomplices, “badgered him, called him names, and told him he had no guts.”
Early v. State, 482 N.E.2d 256, 258 (Ind. 1985)(internal citation omitted)
Limitations of the defense: In general
• [The defense of duress] does not apply to a person who:
(1) recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally placed himself in a situation in which it was foreseeable that he would be subjected to duress; or
(2) committed an offense against the person as defined in IC 35-42.
Limitations of the defense: When the defendant places himself in a situation in which it was foreseeable that he would be subjected to duress
• [T]he statute explicitly provides that the defense does not apply to a person who “recklessly, knowingly, or intentionally placed himself in a situation in which it was foreseeable that he would be subjected to duress.” Because it was [the defendant’s] decision to leave the Witness Protection Program and accept a job requiring an Indiana nursing license—thereby, knowingly placing herself in the allegedly threatening situation—the duress defense is not applicable.
Lohmiller v. State, 884 N.E.2d 903, 910 n. 7 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)
Limitations of the defense: Offenses against the person
• Duress is not a defense to homicide . . . .
McCune v. State, 491 N.E.2d 993, 995 (Ind. 1986)(citing Jefferson v. State, 484 N.E.2d 22, 23-24 (Ind. 1985))
• Attempted murder is, therefore, an offense against the person as defined in I.C. 35-42, and the defense of duress is expressly excluded.
Kee v. State, 438 N.E.2d 993, 994 (Ind. 1982)
• The statute defining the duress defense specifically states that the defense is not applicable to someone who “committed an offense against the person as defined in IC 35-42.” Reckless homicide is an offense against the person, IC 35-42-1-5, and the defense of duress is therefore inapplicable in this case.
Carigg v. State, 696 N.E.2d 392, 397 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998), trans. denied(quoting IC 35-41-3-8(b)(2))
• The defense of duress does not apply to felony-murder prosecutions.
See Moore v. State, 697 N.E.2d 1268, 1273 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998)(“The trial court was correct in determining that [the defendant’s] defense was that of duress and not involuntary conduct. The trial court was also correct in stating that the defense of duress did not apply in this case, as the defense of duress does not apply to offenses against persons.”)
• The statute defining the duress defense specifically states the defense is not applicable to someone who “committed an offense against the person as defined in IC 35-42.” Criminal confinement is a crime against the person, IC 35-42-3-3, and the defense of duress is therefore inapplicable. The analysis holds true for the conspiracy to commit criminal confinement charge as well.
Parker v. State, 567 N.E.2d 105, 109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), trans. denied(quoting IC 35-41-3-8(b)(2))
See Moss v. State, 13 N.E.3d 440, 444 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied(“Per IC 35-41-3-8, which states the defense of duress does not apply to a person that ‘committed the offense against the person as defined in IC 35-42’, the defense of duress does not apply to Moss’s criminal confinement and robbery convictions, because they fall within section 35-42.”)
• The statute excepts crime against the person from the duress defense and this Court has approved this provision; in fact, we have stated previously that duress is not a defense to the crime of robbery.
Early v. State, 482 N.E.2d 256, 258 (Ind. 1985)(citing Ballard v. State, 464 N.E.2d 328, 330 (Ind. 1984))
See Moss v. State, 13 N.E.3d 440, 444 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied(“Per IC 35-41-3-8, which states the defense of duress does not apply to a person that ‘committed the offense against the person as defined in IC 35-42’, the defense of duress does not apply to Moss’s criminal confinement and robbery convictions, because they fall within section 35-42.”)
• [W]e hold that attempted robbery is an offense against the person as defined in IC 35-42 and that the trial court properly instructed the jury that the defense of duress was not applicable in the case at bar.
Armand v. State, 474 N.E.2d 1002, 1005 (Ind. 1985)
As applied to probation violations
• The duress defense may be asserted by probationers who violate terms of probation; however, [the defendant] does not show that the compulsion he felt from the victim’s alleged harassment rose to the degree necessary to constitute duress.
Hensley v. State, 583 N.E.2d 758, 761 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991)(emphasis added)
“Pharmacological duress”
• [The defendant] alleges only that she needed the money to buy heroin in order to prevent withdrawal. While such “pharmacological duress” may appear to her to be a justification for taking part in this incident, it does not constitute a legal defense to the commission of a crime.
Love v. State, 393 N.E.2d 178, 179 (Ind. 1979)(quoting Castle v. United States, 347 F.2d 492, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 929 (1965))