Impeachment

In general

• [S]tatements made by a defendant are admissible for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's trial testimony, even if the statements were obtained in violation of Miranda.

Gauvin v. State, 878 N.E.2d 515, 522 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied(citing Page v. State, 689 N.E.2d 707, 710 (Ind. 1997))

Page v. State, 689 N.E.2d 707, 710 (Ind. 1997)(citing Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971))(“[I]t is well-established that statements by a defendant are admissible for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's trial testimony, even if the statements were obtained in violation of Miranda.”)

See Newton v. State, 456 N.E.2d 736, 742 (Ind. Ct. App. 1983)(internal citation omitted)(“It is a well established rule . . . in Indiana courts that statements inadmissible under Miranda in the State's case in chief may be used for the purpose of impeaching defendant's trial testimony.”)

• Use of a defendant's statements for impeachment is restricted only when such statements are obtained under coercion or duress.

Gauvin v. State, 878 N.E.2d 515, 522-23 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007), trans. denied(citing Page v. State, 689 N.E.2d 707, 710 (Ind. 1997))

Page v. State, 689 N.E.2d 707, 710 (Ind. 1997)(“Use of the defendant's statements as impeachment is restricted only when such statements are obtained under coercion or duress.”)

• To be admissible for impeachment purposes, the tainted statement must be voluntary in the sense of being “the product of a rational intellect and a free will . . . .”

Purcell v. State, 418 N.E.2d 533, 535 (Ind. Ct. App. 1981)(quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978))(alteration in the original)(emphasis omitted)

• For information about voluntariness, please review Voluntariness.

Rationale

• The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.

Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971)

Van Cleave v. State, 517 N.E.2d 356, 367 (Ind. 1987), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1019 (1989)(quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971))

The defendant’s silence after the defendant receives Miranda warnings: In general

• The use for impeachment purposes of a defendant's silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.

Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)(citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976))

See Wilson v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1293, 1296 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)(citing Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976))(“The State violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it uses a defendant's silence after a Miranda warning for impeachment purposes.”)

See also Morgan v. State, 755 N.E.2d 1070, 1074 (Ind. 2001)(“Using a defendant's post-Miranda silence to impeach a defendant at trial violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”)

Cf. Deane v. State, 759 N.E.2d 201, 204 (Ind. 2001)(citing Jones v. State, 355 N.E.2d 402, 405 (Ind. 1976))(“Recognizing the rule set forth in Doyle, we prohibit prosecutors from using a defendant's post-Miranda silence for impeachment purposes.”)

• It is apparent that a defendant's prearrest, post-Miranda silence enjoys the same protection as a defendant's postarrest, post-Miranda silence.

Kubsch v. State, 784 N.E.2d 905, 914 (Ind. 2003)

• For interpretations of “silence,” please review Post-Miranda Warnings Silence.

The defendant’s silence after the defendant receives Miranda warnings: Rationale

• Silence in the wake of these warnings may be nothing more than the arrestee's exercise of these Miranda rights.

Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976)

• Thus, every post-arrest silence is insolubly ambiguous because of what the State is required to advise the person arrested.

Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976)

• Moreover, while it is true that the Miranda warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person's silence to be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.

Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976)

Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)(quoting Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976))(alteration in the original)

• In Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court held that a state violates a criminal defendant's due process rights when it uses the defendant's silence after a Miranda warning to impeach him at trial. The Court grounded its opinion on two distinct rationales. First, it stated that a person's decision to remain silent after being advised of his Miranda rights is “insolubly ambiguous” evidence. Second, the Court emphasized that the use of such silence for impeachment purposes is fundamentally unfair given that the Miranda warnings carry with them an implicit assurance that a person will not be penalized at trial for the exercise of those rights. Subsequent cases have made clear, however, that it is not the ambiguity of the silence but the fundamental unfairness which is of primary importance.

Lynch v. State, 632 N.E.2d 341, 342 (Ind. 1994)(emphasis added)(citations omitted)

See Wilson v. State, 688 N.E.2d 1293,1297 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)(citing Lynch v. State, 632 N.E.2d 341, 342 (Ind. 1994))(“The primary justification for Doyle is that it is fundamentally unfair to use a defendant's silence after receiving Miranda warnings given that the warnings carry an implicit assurance that a person will not be penalized for exercising those rights.”)

See also Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 292 (1986)(“The point of the Doyle holding is that it is fundamentally unfair to promise an arrested person that his silence will not be used against him and thereafter to breach that promise by using the silence to impeach his trial testimony.”)

The defendant’s silence before the defendant receives Miranda warnings: In general

• [T]he Due Process Clause does not prohibit impeachment using a defendant's pre-arrest silence, Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980), or his postarrest, pre-Miranda silence, Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982).

Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)

See Rowe v. State, 717 N.E.2d 1262, 1266 n. 4 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)(“We acknowledge that the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the Constitution does not prohibit the use for impeachment purposes of a defendant's silence prior to arrest, Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 239 (1980), or after arrest if no Miranda warnings are given, Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606-07 (1982).”)

See also Teague v. State, 891 N.E.2d 1121, 1124 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)(“We acknowledge that it is permissible to impeach a defendant at trial based upon his pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence.”)

See also Peters v. State, 959 N.E.2d 347, 353 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011)(citing Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982))(“[A] defendant's post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence may be used for impeachment purposes.”)

• For interpretations of “silence,” please review Post-Miranda Warnings Silence.

The defendant’s silence before the defendant receives Miranda warnings: Rationale

• The rationale is that Doyle protections do not attach “[i]n the absence of the sort of affirmative assurances embodied in the Miranda warnings.”

Lainhart v. State, 916 N.E.2d 924, 935 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009)(quoting Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606-07 (1982))(alteration in the original)